Brazil's Incomplete Stabilization and Reform by Rudiger Dornbusch
RUDIGER  DORNBUSCH 
Massachusetts  Institute  of Technology 
Brazil's Incomplete  Stabilization 
and Reform 
SINCE  THE  INITIATION  of  the Real Plan in July  1994,  after a decade  of 
failed stabilizations,  Brazil has made dramatic progress. Figure 1 makes 
the point  forcefully:  starting from hyperinflation  levels,  inflation has 
been  under control  for the past three years  and there is no  sign  of  it 
coming  back.  But the stabilization  program is unconventional  and this 
raises doubts about its eventual success.  Brazil has big budget deficits, 
large real appreciation,  and a large and growing external deficit; there 
has  been  a major increase  in real wages  and incomplete  progress  on 
broad-based economic  reform. These conditions  recall the many failed 
programs of  Latin America,  including  Brazil's  own  Cruzado Plan of 
1986. 
Will  Brazil stay the course  and return to the high growth rates that 
it experienced  in the 1960s and 1970s and that are common in Asia? Or 
will  it continue  with makeshift policies  that lead to increased vulnera- 
bility  and stand in  the  way  of  such  dramatic improvements  as  have 
occurred in Chile  and are now  underway in Argentina? In particular, 
how will Brazil handle the significant real appreciation, growing exter- 
nal deficits,  and incomplete  structural reform? With politics  seeming 
always  to  take  the  front  seat,  will  there ever  be  a good  time  to  at- 
tend to  these  important issues,  which  stand in the way  of  economic 
improvement? 
If Brazil  fails  to make dramatic improvements,  it is  very  unlikely 
that it will  experience  a Mexican-style  collapse  or a pervasive  loss  of 
confidence.  There  are 150 million  Brazilians,  and they  are relentless 
optimists.  Beyond  that,  trade controls,  a more rapid crawling  peg,  a 
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Figure 1. CPI Inflation,  Monthly Rates, 1992-97a 
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Source: Author's calculations based on data from International  Monetary Fund (IMF), Initernlationial  Finianicial  Statistics, 
various  issues. 
a. Sample period is January  1992 to February  1997. Data are monthly;  tic marks  correspond  to January. 
devaluation,  or all three together,  would  easily  avoid  the worst.  But 
Brazilians will say,  "Why be pessimistic  at all? With high productivity 
growth and an improved distribution of income,  Brazil could provide a 
new model by getting  ahead on all fronts."  Perhaps it will.  But more 
likely  not,  and so the stabilization  strategy is just giving  Brazil more 
time-perhaps  a lot of time-to  procrastinate on growth policies. 
The issue is not the possibility  of near-term collapse,  but that policies 
and performance  are unnecessarily  disappointing.  Since  the  1990-92 
recession  there has been  an upturn, and growth is now running at 3.0 
to 4.5  percent.  But that is still  far from the performance of  Brazil  in 
1960-80  or the more recent experience  of  emerging  economies  from 
Chile  to Malaysia.  The  current strategy of  income  redistribution and Rudiger Dornbusch  369 
Figure  2.  Real Per Capita GDP, 1963-96 







I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995 
Source:  Author's  calculations.  Data for 1963-94 are from IMF,  Ititernzationial  Finianicial  Statistics, various issues. For 1995-96, 
GDP data are from J. P. Morgan,  Emizerginig  Markets:  Econzomiic  Inidicators,  April 4, 1997; and population  data are estimated by 
the author. 
making do will  not translate into the sustained  high growth rates that 
are the  hallmark of  successful  stabilization  and reform.  In fact,  the 
external deficit and the government's  inability or unwillingness  to bring 
down the budget deficit increasingly  distort incentives  and undermine 
stability. 
Looking Back: Growth, Inflation, and 
Many Failed Stabilizations 
In the  mid- 1970s,  Brazil  had every  right to  expect  extraordinary 
performance.  Figure 2 shows  the country's  rapid growth in per capita 370  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1997 
Table 1. Macroeconomic  Performance, 1965-97 
Percent 
Cuirrent  account 
Period  Growth rate  Inflation rateb  balancec 
1965_79d  5.9  30  -3.0 
1980-93d  0.3  423  -  1.4 
1993  2.3  2,149  0.0 
1994  4.2  2,669  -0.2 
1995  2.7  23  -  2.5 
1996  1.5  10  -  3.2 
1997c  2.3  7  -4.0 
Source: Author's calculations. Data for 1965-94  are from IMF, Inzternationaal  Fitianicital  Statistics, various isslues;  and for 
1995-97.  from J. P. Morgan, Emerging Markets: Econontic Iinditcators,  April 4,  1997. 
a. Percent change in real GDP per capita. 
b. Percent change in CPI. 
c.  As a percentage of GDP. 
d. Annual average. 
e.  Forecast. 
income, which had been higher than in almost any other country for 
over a decade. The Brazilian model had been successful and showed 
no sign of running  out of steam. The country  had mastered  living with 
inflation and import substitution. A mixed economy with a very dy- 
namic public sector provided a successful growth strategy, and high 
growth  contained  the problems  of income distribution  that  might other- 
wise have surfaced.' The  "'Washington  consensus" was nowhere in 
sight, and Brazil was getting ahead  in the wrong lane. 
Brazil's depressing experience over the past fifteen years stands in 
sharp  contrast  to that of the preceding  decades. Table 1 presents  some 
statistics on Brazil's economic performance  since 1965. It has always 
had some inflation, but in the late 1980s inflation soared to unprece- 
dented  levels. More striking, Brazil has experienced  high growth  rates 
for much of the postwar  period. Over 1950-80,  growth averaged  7.1 
percent  per year. With average population  growth at 2.7 percent over 
that period, real per capita GDP almost quadrupled.2  At the beginning 
of the 1980s, Brazil held great  promise as an emerging  economy, with 
a track record of growth and the expectation of exceptionally strong 
performance.  Nothing  of that  has materialized:  Brazil  remains  the coun- 
1. See Bacha (1977), Cardoso  and Fishlow (1990), and Malan  and Bonelli (1977). 
2.  See Cardoso  and Fishlow (1990). Rudi2er  Dornbusch  371 
try of the future. But after the disillusionment,  the completion of reform 
and stabilization  offer a chance to return to strong performance. 
Brazil is rightly famous-and  infamous-as  a model of living  with 
inflation. A system of comprehensive  and effective  indexation,  ranging 
from the labor market to public  sector  prices  and from the exchange 
rate to  financial  markets,  has ensured  that inflation  is  relatively  sta- 
ble and financial markets can function,  preventing  money  from being 
driven offshore.  The system  was perfected  during the military regime 
in the late  1960s  to center on ex  post  inflation  with  infrequent read- 
justment.  Initially,  indexation  adjustments  to  wages  were  made  an- 
nually,  so that price shocks  would be substantially  diluted rather than 
quickly  turned into a price-wage  spiral. Moreover,  since  the exchange 
rate rule made no allowance  for external inflation,  there was a built-in 
real depreciation  effect.3  As  a result,  external balance problems  were 
never  significant.  Indeed,  until the late  1970s  the military regime  did 
succeed in avoiding macroeconomic  problems and, through indexation, 
preventing  significant  misalignments  in  relative  prices  and  capital 
flight. 
Figure  3  shows  the  Brazilian  inflation  rate from  the  stabilization 
implemented  by the military regime in the mid- 1960s to the eve of the 
Cruzado Plan,  the most gloriously  failed  heterodox  stabilization.  Bra- 
zil's  claim to living  well  with inflation goes  back to the late  1960s and 
early  1970s,  when  inflation  was  moderate-20  to  30  percent-quite 
stable  and  even  declining  slightly.  In  combination  with  very  high 
growth,  stability  and prosperity seemed  unproblematic. 
The oil shocks of the 1970s changed this picture. Brazil was a major 
importer of  oil.  At the outset,  increases  in the domestic  prices  of  oil 
products  were  postponed  and the external  deficits  occasioned  by  the 
higher prices and the lack of adjustment were financed in the emerging 
debt market. Prudently, the government practiced long-term borrowing. 
Had the oil  shock  been transitory,  all might have ended well,  but the 
second  oil  shock  made it clear that there would  be no early relief.  A 
large  external  deficit  led  to  accumulating  debt.  The  United  States's 
battle against inflation in the early  1980s made external financing pre- 
carious. Passing on the oil price increases to the domestic market, with 
3.  See Simonsen  (1984,  1986) for an extensive  discussion  of the indexation arrange- 
ments written from the perspective  of the early  1980s,  giving  a glimpse  of the problem 
and no little indication  of what was to come. 372  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1997 
Figure 3.  CPI Inflation, Annual  Rates,  1965-84a 
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Source:  Author's  calculations  based on data  from from IMF,  Initernlationial  Fitnanicial  Statistics, various  issuLes. 
a. Sample period is January  1965 to December 1984. Data are monthly  at annual  rates;  tic marks  correspond  to JanLiary. 
its comprehensive  indexation,  doubled the rate of inflation from about 
40  percent  in  the  mid-1970s  to  98  percent  in  1982.  Moreover,  the 
frequency of indexation adjustments was increased from once a year to 
every  six  months,  which,  substantially  accommodated  by passive 
money,  increased  the inflation  rate even  further. The  debt crises  cut 
short the  opportunities  for external  rollover  and deficit  finance.  The 
party  was  over  and Brazil  was  on  its  way  to  extreme  inflation  and 
stagnation. 
In the face  of  full  domestic  indexation  of  wages  and the exchange 
rate, oil price increases became  wage  increases,  which,  in turn, led to 
another and higher round of price inflation.4 To reduce the average real 
4.  See Simonsen (1984, 1986) for the mechanics  of supply shocks in the context of 
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wage  between  indexation  adjustments,  which  reset wages,  the rate of 
inflation had to increase,  producing a more substantial erosion  of real 
wages  over the wage  cycle.  Monetary policy  accommodated  this pro- 
cess.  Annual  inflation  surpassed  100 percent  in the early  1980s;  but 
even then,  it seemed  relatively  stable. 
In hindsight,  there was  a steady  acceleration  with  wide  swings  in 
the  month-to-month  inflation  rate.  Because  inflation  depressed  real 
wages,  the system  of  annual wage  increases  gave  way to semiannual 
raises and then to progressively  more frequent increases.  The inflation 
rate accelerated  and the inflation stability of the early  1970s  was lost. 
By  1985,  inflation  had  surpassed  200  percent,  with  no  prospect  of 
subsiding. 
Brazilian economists  have long  recognized  that in a setting of full, 
compulsory indexation,  orthodox monetary restraint is not a satisfactory 
answer to inflation.  The idea that inflation has inertia, by virtue of the 
indexation  law and practice,  implies  the need for an alternative stabi- 
lization strategy,  namely,  "heterodoxy."  The issue is not only to con- 
trol demand,  but,  more  important,  to  coordinate  a stop to  wage  and 
price increases,  which feed on one another. The ill-fated Cruzado Plan 
of  1986 was designed  to accomplish  this.  The plan gave central place 
to a coordinated incomes policy,  including cutting back wage increases, 
partial adjustment of wage contracts that had not yet been adjusted, and 
vigorous enforcement  of price controls.  Inflation would be killed over- 
night; euphoria would ensue.  Since  Brazil's  inflation was not the out- 
come  of  inflationary  money  creation-the  government  was  perfectly 
able to finance itself  in the capital market-it  was altogether plausible 
to use the stopping of the wage-price process as the central disinflation- 
ary measure.  It was  not plausible,  however,  to take advantage of the 
prevailing  calm by immediately  stepping up demand with a major ex- 
pansion. The boom was short-lived,  price controls became binding, and 
markets became  distorted.  (The government  ultimately  had to use the 
air force to round up cattle that were being withheld from the market.) 
Not surprisingly,  the episode  ended in a wave  of corrective  inflation. 
By late 1987,  Brazilian inflation was running at nearly 400 percent and 
rising. 
The Cruzado Plan is of interest because  it highlights  the basic con- 
ception of inflation in Brazil: inflation is sui generis,  characterized by 
the inertia of an implicit or explicit  indexation scheme and the resulting 374  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1997 
inability  of  restrictive  monetary policy  to promote  disinflation  rather 
than recession.  The plan also highlights Brazil's low threshold for pain. 
Implementation of a restrictive demand policy  to reinforce the incomes 
policy  was  never  considered;  to  the  contrary,  demand  was  actually 
stimulated.  The failure of subsequent stabilization  programs has much 
to do with these two points. 
The following  years were marked by repeated unsuccessful  attempts 
to  stop  inflation.  Each  stabilization  was  shortly  followed  by  another 
round of  inflation,  with successively  higher peaks.  Most introduced a 
new money  or at least skipped a few  zeros,  but each plan had its own 
name and its own special  features: some did not specify  any measures 
at  all,  others  called  for  the  freezing  and  inflationary  erosion  of  all 
nominal  assets,  all had some particular mechanism  to disarm inflation 
inertia. There was the Cruzado Plan, Cruzado 2,  the Plan Bresser,  the 
Summer  Plan,  the  Collor  Plan,  Collor  2,  and  finally  the  Real  Plan 
(named after the new currency that it introduced), which is still in place 
and,  though  incomplete,  may  be  the  lasting  solution  to  Brazil's 
inflation. 
The Real Plan uses neither wage-price  controls nor the confiscation 
of assets.  And in the Brazilian context,  a sharp contraction of demand 
was  also  out of  the question.  Recognizing  that even  without  extreme 
inflation rates inertia and coordination were major problems,  the archi- 
tects  of  the  plan  had to  devise  some  way  to  bring wage-  and price- 
setting into a noninflationary regime.  This time, rather than readjusting 
all contracts  to coordinate  a simultaneous  disinflation,  they  chose  an 
elaborate move  into a unified reference  value.  Wages  were converted 
into  this  unit  of  account  in  March  1994,  at their  average  over  the 
previous  four months,  thus avoiding  inflationary erosion.  Once  con- 
verted,  wages  were indexed  on an annual basis  for another year.  The 
unit of  account,  in turn, was linked to the dollar,  and when the stabi- 
lization  formally  began,  it became  the new  currency-the  real-at  a 
parity of one to one. 
In the immediate  aftermath of  stabilization,  the new  money  appre- 
ciated against the dollar by nearly  15 percent,  reinforcing the disinfla- 
tion.  However,  over the next year,  various forms of wage  adjustment 
sharply raised  wages.  Just as under the previous  stabilization  plans, 
disinflation  was  incomplete  and there was  no assurance that it would 
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Poststabilization Tensions 
Once inflation had been brought down by the shift into a new money, 
several  critical  developments  followed.  Key  features  are highlighted 
here,  some  of which are discussed  in more detail below. 
-The  exchange  rate was fixed at one to one on the dollar as Brazil 
emerged  from the transition period.  Then the real appreciated signifi- 
cantly  against the dollar between  1994  and 1996,  reinforcing  the dis- 
inflationary effect of the monetary reform. Depending on the measure- 
wages,  the  consumer  price  index  (CPI),  or  manufactured  goods 
prices-the  appreciation was between 3 and 76 percent. With excessive 
real appreciation,  as evidenced  by Brazil's  trade problems,  the initial 
slipping  of the real followed  by the implementation  of a crawling peg 
have created a relatively  stable,  though strongly  appreciated,  real ex- 
change rate. 
-A  huge increase in real wages  occurred in the process of shifting 
to the new money.  This increase was the product of a combination  of 
factors,  including  deliberate  wage  policy,  indexation,  some  inertia 
being  carried over  into  the  new  money,  and real  appreciation.  One 
statistic  suffices  to  illustrate  the  magnitude  of  the  change:  the  real 
income  of the bottom 50 percent of the income  distribution rose by 35 
percent over  1993-95. 
-A  very  rapid rise  in  industrial  production  and  a  shift  to  large 
external  deficits  were  driven  by  the  return of  credit  and real  wage 
growth.  The risk of  reigniting  inflation persuaded the government  to 
raise real interest rates to extremely  high levels  (just as in Germany in 
1925).  In 1995, real interest rates averaged over 40 percent; bankruptcy 
was pervasive  and a large number of  banks were destroyed.  But as a 
disinflation  strategy,  it worked. 
-The  high interest rates not only  slowed  growth and significantly 
increased the problems of the banks,  but also led to very large capital 
inflows.  Foreign  exchange  reserves  increased  from $32  billion  in De- 
cember  1993 to $52  billion  in December  1995; by late  1996,  they had 
risen to $59 billion. 
-A  significant  deterioration of  the external  balance resulted  from 
import trade liberalization  in the early  1990s,  strong demand,  and real 
appreciation. From near equilibrium in 1992,  the external balance had 
moved to a deficit of $24 billion  by  1996,  and it is still rising. 376  Brookinigs  Pcapers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1997 
Table  2.  Median  Real Monthly  Wage  Income, by Income Group, 1990-95 
September 1995 reais, except as indicated 
Percenit chantge, 
Inicomiie  group9  1990  1993  1995  1993-95 
Bottom 10 percent  29  23  42  83 
Bottom 50 percent  96  86  116  35 
Top  10 percent  1,707  1,648  2,044  24 
Source; Author's calcuilations  based on data froil the PNAD. a household survey conducted by the Instituito  Brasileiro de 
Geopranhia  e  Foonoinia  (ICB.Fl) 
Real  Wages and Real Income 
The stabilization  has been a massive  political  success  not only  be- 
cause there is no longer any inflation, but also because there have been 
substantial gains  in real income  for all workers,  and in particular, the 
poor.  This  section  reviews  the basic facts  on real wages,  income  dis- 
tribution, and the reduction of poverty in the aftermath of stabilization. 
In the years  1990-92,  per capita GDP was falling.  The year of the 
stabilization,  1994,  as  well  as  1995,  were  characterized  by  strongly 
rising GDP per capita. But beyond the growth in output, a lot happened 
on  the  side  of  real  wages.  In  Sao  Paulo,  for  example,  real  wages 
increased  by 26  percent between  1993 and  1996.5 The real minimum 
wage also increased significantly.  The minimum wage plays a key role 
in the Brazilian economy;  it directly affects  the 21 percent of the labor 
force estimated to work below the minimum wage,  and is also a bench- 
mark wage  for the formal sector.  Rodrigo Reis  Soares shows  that the 
minimum  wage  exerts  a significant  influence  on real earnings.  More- 
over,  the reduction in inflation reduced the inflationary erosion  of  the 
real wage over the indexation cycle.6 
The gain in real wages has led to a major redistribution of income in 
Brazil.  Household  survey  evidence  shows  both  a rise  in real  wages 
overall  and  a  rise  in  the  relative  wages  of  low-income  workers.7 
Table 2 shows  the distribution of real wage changes.  While real labor 
income  has increased for every  decile  of the distribution,  the average 
5.  See  Conjuntitura  Economica,  various issues. 
6.  See  Neri,  Considera,  and Pinto (1996),  Reis Soares (1997).  and Rocha (1996a). 
7.  Data are from tabulations reported in Instituto Brasiliero  de Geographia e Econ- 
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real wage  of  those  in the bottom  10 percent nearly doubled  between 
1993 and 1995.  And the relative position of the poorest group has risen 
dramatically: between  1993 and 1995,  the ratio of those  in the top  10 
percent wage  to that of those  in the bottom  10 percent declined  from 
72 to 49.8 
The  same  phenomenon  occurred under the Cruzado Plan.  In  1986 
the real median income of the poorest group briefly recorded an increase 
of 77 percent,  but this did not last in either absolute or relative terms. 
Price  controls  provided  a temporary  stabilization  that  ended  in  a 
blowout  .9 
The real wage gains and their distribution can also be considered  in 
terms of the issue  of poverty.  This  is a central issue  in Brazil,  where 
income  distribution  is extraordinarily  bad,  even  by third world  stan- 
dards. 10 In the decades preceding the Real Plan, the income distribution 
had grown steadily worse: in the 1960s the income share of the poorest 
60 percent was 25 percent and by the  1990s  it had fallen  to only  16.3 
percent.  Over  the  same  period,  the  share  of  the  richest  10  percent 
increased from 39.7  to 49.7  percent."  The Real Plan  taken together 
with other domestic  developments,  including growth, the restoration of 
bank credit,  and improvements  in agriculture  has led to a dramatic 
improvement  in poverty. 12 The real wage gains and increased employ- 
ment moved  almost  13 million  people  over the poverty line during the 
first year of the plan.  The proportion of poor in the population  fell  to 
the  levels  during  the  Cruzado  Plan,  a  decade  earlier.  The  data  are 
8.  It seems  reasonable  to ask how  real wages  could  increase  so  substantially.  The 
answer is that the  share of  labor in Brazil's  GDP  is  actually  very  low:  about 30  to 35 
percent,  according  to oral tradition (no estimates  from the income  side are available). 
9.  Brazil's  heterodox  stabilization  under the  Cruzado  Plan  followed  a  path  very 
similar to that of Peru in the mid-1980s,  under Alain Garcia: a big hike in wages,  fixed 
exchange  rates, a boom,  and a big bust. 
10.  Deininger  and Squire (1996)  show that the ratio of the top quintile to the bottom 
quintile of the income  distribution,  averaged over  1960-89,  is 23 for Brazil,  exceeded 
only  by Armenia (24),  Honduras (28),  and Guinea-Bissau  (29).  For Chile.  this ratio is 
14, and the average for East Asia  is 7. 
11.  See  Bonelli  and Ramnos  (1992,  table  1, p. 5). 
12.  For a discussion  of the evolution  and measurement of Brazilian poverty,  includ- 
ing in the context  of  the  Real  Plan,  see  Rocha  (1996a,  1996b),  Neri,  Considera,  and 
Pinto (1996),  and Sonia  Rocha,  "Crise,  Estabilizcdo,  e Pobreza-1990  a 1995,"  Con- 
junctlura Econ6mica,  January 1997,  pp. 22-26. 378  Brookings  Papers  on Econiomic Activity,  1:1 997 
impressive:  between  1990 and 1995,  the total number of poor declined 
from 42 million  to only 30.4  million,  and the fraction of poor, from 30 
percent to only 21 percent.'3 
The real wage gains and their favorable effects  on the income distri- 
bution actually understate the extent to which the situation has improved 
for workers. 1'  The disappearance of  the inflation tax on real balances 
accounts  for some  increase  in real income,  as does  the elimination  of 
the variation of real income within the adjustment cycle.  It is important 
to  recognize  that the  restoration  of  credit  that always  comes  with  a 
reduction of inflation also raises the standard of living. 
Consumption  boomed  soon  after the plan was  initiated.  Credit ex- 
pansion reinforced the spending impact of the rise in real wages. 'I  The 
share of  consumption  in GDP rose  to  82.1  percent,  in contrast to an 
average  of  77  percent over the period  1980-94.  The only  time  in the 
past fifteen years when consumption  reached similar levels  was  1986, 
the year of the Cruzado Plan; indeed,  the share was virtually identical 
at that time  82.3  percent.  The comparison  is uncomfortable. 
A major rise in real wages  is a feature common  to many countries 
that have undergone stabilization programs, in Latin America and else- 
where.  To the extent that real wage increases and a consumption  boom 
have ultimately  led to the failure of several stabilizations,  or at least to 
difficulties,  this  must be held  out as a prospect  for Brazil.'6  As  dis- 
cussed,  the Real  Plan has been successful  in creating growth with an 
improved  income  distribution.  Real  wage  gains  have been significant 
across the board, and in the bottom half of the distribution, in particular. 
The obvious  question  is how to make these effects  last.  Alternatively, 
one  could  ask  what is  the other side  of  the coin  of  the gains  in real 
wages  and income.  If these gains are coupled  with external borrowing 
and overvaluation,  then caution is important, because this stabilization 
may not last long enough  as the Cruzado Plan did not  to increasingly 
13.  See Sonia Rocha,  "Crise,  EstabilizcJo,  e Pobreza-1990  a 1995,"  Conjunctulra 
Econ6nmica, January 1997,  p 26. 
14.  Even  before  the  introduction  of  the  Real  Plan,  Cardoso,  Paes  de  Barros,  and 
Urani (1995)  had noted  the  adverse  impact of  certain  macroeconomic  conditions-in 
particular, inflation-on  income  distribution. 
15.  Real credit to consumers  expanded  by 98.7  percent in the period July  1994 to 
July  1996; see Conjunturca  Econ6nmica, various issues. 
16.  See  Kiguel  and Liviatan (1992),  Dornbusch,  Goldfajn,  and Valdes  (1995),  and 
Rebelo  and Vegh  (1995). Rudiger  Dortnbusch  379 
and rapidly translate into reforms and the resulting advances in produc- 
tivity.  At best it is a prepayment on reform, at worst,  an unaffordable 
consumption  boom. 
The Real Exchange  Rate 
In the aftermath of the Mexican collapse,  the real exchange  rate has 
come to assume a special place in judging  the success  of a stabilization 
program.  Even  though other factors  contributed to the massive  melt- 
down  in Mexico-for  example,  shortening of  debt,  dollarization,  ex- 
pansionary  credit  policy-the  large real appreciation  played  a major 
role in setting the scene for a crisis. " Going beyond the Mexican case, 
Ilan Goldfajn and Rodrigo Vald6s provide a cletailed study of large real 
appreciations  worldwide.  '  For a cross-section  of  ninety-three  coun- 
tries,  they do not find a single  case of a real appreciation of 35 percent 
or more (adjusted for trend and fundamentals)  that did not ultimately 
result in a major depreciation.  And even for somewhat  more moderate 
real appreciation,  they find that the probability of a large real deprecia- 
tion is very substantial. 
It is  important therefore to ask where  Brazil  stands in this regard. 
The issue  of real appreciation inevitably  arises,  because  the Brazilian 
data are very striking. As always,  interpretations differ.  Analyzing  the 
industrial price index for Sao Paulo relative to Brazil's  trading partners 
since the inception of the Real Plan, Edmar Bacha concludes  that there 
was a modest real appreciation of 6 percent by mid- 1996. The Instituto 
de Economia  do Setor Publico  (IESP)  reports a real exchange  rate in 
industry and shows  roughly  the same results.  Eliana Cardoso investi- 
gates a broad range of indexes to conclude that, by some measures, real 
appreciation has been as high as 40 percent under the Real Plan. Alfonso 
Pastore  and  Maria Pinotti  likewise  find evidence  of  substantial  real 
appreciation. '9 
Goldman  Sachs  uses  a model-based  approach to determine  funda- 
mental exchange  rates as benchmarks for judging  over- or undervalua- 
tion.  Based  on this model,  by February 1997 the real was overvalued 
17.  See  Dornbusch,  Goldfajn,  and Valdes  (1995)  and also  Sachs,  Tornell,  and Ve- 
lasco (1996). 
18.  Goldfajn and Valdes  (1996). 
19.  Bacha (1996);  Instituto de Economia do Setor Piblico,  Jndicadores  IESP 6(58), 
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Figure  4.  Two  Indicators  of Currency  Overvaluation,  1992-96' 
Index, January 1992 =  100 
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by  19. 1 percent.  Gustavo  Franco,  one of the leading  architects of the 
Real Plan,  rejects the hypothesis  of overvaluation  on the grounds that 
Brazil  is  in an unprecendented  situation,  for which  past data are not 
relevant; the present combination  of high productivity growth, an open 
economy,  and stable money  is unique in Brazil's  history.20 
Figure  4  presents  two  indicators  of  overvaluation  for  Brazil.  One 
series  is  the Brazilian  wholesale  price  index,  deflated by the real-to- 
dollar exchange  rate; that is,  wholesale  prices in dollars.  This measure 
shows  an increase  of  about 25 percent over January 1994,  before  the 
adoption of the Real Plan. However,  it makes no adjustment for prices 
in dollars of goods in competitor countries,  whether Argentina, with its 
20.  Ades  (1996);  Franco (1996). Rudiger  Dorn1blusch  381 
Figure 5.  J. P. Morgan  Real Effective  Exchange  Rate,  1977-97a 
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increased price level,  or Europe and Japan, where prices in dollars have 
fallen  sharply in the past several years. 
The other series in figure 4 shows the ratio of the Brazilian consumer 
price index to the wholesale  price index.  This serves as a rough proxy 
for the price  ratio of  nontradables to tradables.  By  this  measure,  the 
relative  price  ratio has risen  by  almost  50  percent  since  early  1994. 
This  represents  an extraordinary shift  in relative  prices,  as could  be 
expected  from the large  shifts  in income  distribution  and real wages 
discussed  above. 
Figure 5 reports the J. P. Morgan real effective  exchange  rate since 
January 1977.2'  A rise in this index represents a real appreciation.  By 
21.  During  periods  of  high  inflationi, measuLrement  of  real exchange  rates is  poor 382  Brookings  Papers  oni Economic  Activity,  1:1997 
Table  3.  Alternative  Measures  of the Real Exchange  Rate, 1993-96 
Index,  1990=  100 
Real exchange rate measure  1993  1994  1995  1996 
CPI/WPI  114  129  154  172 
Exchange rate indexes;t 
J. P. Morgan, nonfood wholesale  prices  82  95  101  97 
IPEA, manufactured goods prices  82  89  94  92 
Fundap, industrial goods prices  89  96  98  97 
Fundap, CPI  82  93  112  120 
IPEA, wages  107  139  196  245 
Source: CPI and WPI data are from IMF  r  l  nctztiona(il  Finoancial  Statistics,  varioLS  issues. J. P. Morgani  data are fronit 
the J. P. Morgan currency index database, available on J. P. Morgans  s worldsvide web page. IPEA data are provided directlyZ 
from the Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada. Fundap data are frotio  Instituto de Econioioia  do Setol Publico, Indi,(- 
dot-es  IESP 6(58)1 January-February 1997. 
a. Indexes are constructed so that an increase represents an appreciationt  of the real. Effective exchianige  rate indexes ate 
deflated as indicated. 
this measure,  the real exchange  rate has been quite high for over two 
years, its level  matched only by brief episodes  on the eve of the Collor 
Plan and the 1982 debt crisis.  This time series illustrates how hard it is 
to decide on a benchmark for assessing  the real appreciation. Compared 
with the average for the period  1980-94-when  Brazil's  performance 
deteriorated-the  current real effective  exchange  rate has appreciated 
by 35 percent.  Of that, 5 percent is due to the very recent rise in the 
value of the dollar relative to European currencies and the yen.  Table 
3 reports several real exchange rate measures, including trade-weighted 
(effective)  exchange  rates, all of which show  some real appreciation. 
The possibility  that this real appreciation represents an overvaluation 
arouses concern because large real appreciations have almost invariably 
ended in external  crises.  The problem accumulates  over time  and in- 
duces  a growing  external  deficit.  The  exchange  rate becomes  unsus- 
tainable whenever events undercut the rollover of debt and the financing 
of current account deficits.  Even without an actual crisis,  overvaluation 
cuts into growth and in this fashion  signals  its unsustainability. 
Large real appreciation,  without fundamental support, involves  in- 
creased vulnerability and, for that reason,  makes a country more prone 
to crisis. When and how the crisis comes about depends on the particular 
circumstances.  For example,  a political  reversal could break a pattern 
because  wage  and price data are not synchronized.  The bias  is  systematic,  in that the 
relevant price is understated (because  of  reporting lags)  and consequently  the reported 
real exchange  rate is overdepreciated  relative  to the true rate. Rudiger Dornbusch  383 
of continuity and credibility and lead to a sell off; a bout of easy money 
would  hasten such a crisis,  a fragile banking system  with foreign  cur- 
rency exposure would magnify the collapse,  and a liquid debt structure 
would accelerate and magnify the collapse.  Financial considerations are 
all important in interpreting specific  events,  but must not be miscon- 
strued as the primary or sole  source of a collapse. 
Before  a crisis,  there is little agreement on what is a misaligned  real 
exchange  rate. Because  of that disagreement,  real appreciation can run 
its course.  But theory can help to predict what should happen to equi- 
librium relative  prices.  If an economy  undergoes reform,  specifically, 
significant  trade opening  and restructuring that reduces  employment 
and hence  leads  to a decline  in the equilibrium  wage  in dollars,  real 
appreciation is the wrong development.  The basic point is that reforms 
that reduce  employment,  at least  in the medium  term,  in themselves 
create an overriding presumption that real depreciation is necessary. 
Brazil has opened trade very substantially.  Quotas have been almost 
completely  abandoned,  and the average  tariff fell  from 51  percent to 
only  14 percent between  1988 and 1994.22  Import penetration in man- 
ufacturing has increased  sharply.  Imports as a percentage  of apparent 
consumption  rose from 4.4  in 1989 to  15.5  in  1995.23 
Economic  reform-trade  liberalization,  deregulation,  restructuring, 
privatization  and  government  downsizing,  opening  the  capital  ac- 
count-has  two important impacts.  First, by improving resource allo- 
cation,  its raises  productivity  and hence  the long-run economic  pros- 
pects  of  the economy.24 This  effect  might  best  be  summarized  as an 
increase in the valuation of equity in those industries that benefit from 
liberalization; and it is not unambiguous,  because opening will trim the 
scope for collusive  profits and hidden subsidies.  Nevertheless,  in com- 
bination,  the reform measures  invariably make the economy  more at- 
tractive to outside  investors  and hence raise the valuation of assets. 
Second  is the impact of  the reform measures on labor.  In the long 
run, it is plausible that a country that uses its resources more effectively 
22.  See Cardoso (1996)  and Abreu, Carneiro, and Werneck (1996). 
23.  See  Mesquita  Moreira and Correa (1996,  table 2).  It is interesting  to note that 
there is no commensurate  rise in the ratio of exports to production.  Although  this ratio 
did rise  over  the  period  1989-95,  it did  so  only  from  10. 1  to  14.9  percent.  It is  the 
differential opening  on the import side that is of interest here. 
24.  This point is central to the discussion  in Franco (1996). 384  Brookinigs Papers  on Econiomnic  Activity,  1:1997 
and puts itself  in a position  to attract foreign  investment  will  also pay 
higher real wages.  But that is definitely  not the case  in the short run, 
before  the reallocation  of  resources  is substantially  underway and in- 
vestment  in new  plant and equipment is realized.  In fact,  in the short 
run the equilibrium  wage  in dollars  must fall.  Thus stock  prices  and 
equilibrium wages  in dollars (or the exchange  rate) are likely  to move 
in opposite  directions. 
Despite  the argument that trade liberalization calls for real deprecia- 
tion and a decline  in wages in dollars, one cannot presume that in a live 
situation involving  a complex  set of reforms,  including  a return to the 
world capital market, this must actually happen. In fact,  I have shown 
that exactly  the opposite  can take place:  real wages  rise  and the real 
exchange  rate appreciates.  But that precisely  highlights  the tension.  In 
the labor market, the reforms call for wages  in dollars to fall  in order 
to accommodate the reduction in labor demand in the government sector 
and in import-competing  businesses  that face  unprecedented competi- 
tion. Yet wages in dollars are driven up by the dominant effect of capital 
inflows. 
There are two  ways  in which  such  a situation  might  arise without 
incurring  short-term employment  problems.  In one  case,  a boom  in 
physical  investment uses labor in the implementation process and, over 
the  longer  term,  creates  new jobs  in the  domestic  goods  and export 
sectors  at unchanged  or even  increased  wages.  It is conceivable  that 
this  could  be  accomplished  by  pervasive  deregulation  and increased 
efficiency  in public  finance,  or improved  market access  abroad. The 
expansion  of exports due to the elimination  of a host of implicit  taxes, 
for example,  would be sufficient.  The more antiexport bias there is in 
the initial  system,  the better the chance  that reform will  pay for itself 
in the labor market, without any need for wage  cuts and depreciation. 
In the typical  distorted economy,  though,  exports  have long  received 
special  attention  and  anti-import  bias  has  increasingly  been  super- 
imposed.  In such a case,  the overwhelming  presumption is that there 
will  be wage  cuts and depreciation. 
Measures to increase the profitability of exports,  including,  for ex- 
ample,  privatizing  ports and allowing  access  to imported intermediate 
goods at reduced tariffs, can translate into substantial export expansion. 
But such expansion  is not often large enough to absorb the excess  labor 
generated  by  the reforms.  Even  though  exports  expansion  is  strong, Rudiger  Dornbusch  385 
unemployment  is  high.  To  a significant  extent,  depreciation  and the 
reform of  labor market institutions  are substitutes; without either,  un- 
employment  is  certain to  rise.  Even  with  credible  reform,  it takes  a 
very long time to realize the investment required to expand net exports 
and the high growth needed to absorb the excess  labor. 
Deflation  does  not come  quickly  and hence the economy  is trapped 
in a situation of high unemployment.  Lower levels  of wages and prices 
in dollars are the most effective  solutions  to the problem, although one 
can always find some other reforms that might help. Argentina is a good 
case  in  point:  widespread  restructuring  and  real  appreciation  have 
caused  unemployment  to rise to nearly 20 percent,  and investment  is 
not  booming.  The  wage  in  dollars  must  fall  in  order to  help  create 
employment.  Given  the  fixed  exchange  rate,  that  means  deflation, 
which,  in this case  as always,  is painful and hence  slow. 
The alternative way to accommodate deregulation,  restructuring, and 
trade liberalization  is by means of a domestic spending boom. The Diaz 
Alejandro effect-a  short-run rise  in real demand-and  access  to the 
world capital market will  both push in this direction,  and fiscal expan- 
sion can help. But a spending boom is clearly only a short-term solution. 
After a year or two,  as productivity  gains  take hold and the spending 
effect  wears  off,  unemployment  increasingly  becomes  a  problem. 
Moreover,  this  is  unlikely  to  be  an economy  in which  resources  are 
reallocated to export expansion  and import substitution,  but rather, one 
that overspends  on imports and neglects  to build the jobs  on the trade 
front that ultimately  support high wages.  As a result,  in the longer run 
major imbalances  arise.  The  other side  of  the  coin,  a large  external 
deficit,  reflects  the  availability  of  "cheap"  imports,  a high  level  of 
domestic  demand,  and easy  financing  in the world  market. When  fi- 
nancing suddenly  stops,  the corrective  depreciation  is substantial. 
When trying  to explain  why  a particular real exchange  rate is  not 
overvalued,  governments  often point to productivity gains.  They note 
that reforms  have  translated  into  vastly  improved  opportunities  for 
firms; as a result,  firms are competitive,  even  at a significantly  appre- 
ciated real exchange rate. This argument needs scrutiny for two reasons. 
First, why is there real appreciation if firms are so much more efficient? 
Real wages  may rise without a deterioration in unit labor costs.  But a 
rise in prices in dollars would  suggest  that productivity  improvements 
are not dominant,  and for that reason,  competitiveness  is  lost.  Typi- 386  Brookings  Pcapers on Econoinic  Activity,  1:1997 
Table 4.  Change  in Industrial  Production,  Employment,  and Productivity,  1970-95 
Percent per year 
Period  Prodluctioni  Emiploymient  ProdluctivitY 
1970-80  9.0  6.5  2.4 
1980-90  -  0.2  -  0.4  0.2 
1990-95  2.1  -  5.1  7.5 
Source: Consider-a  ( 1996. table I1 p. 41 ). 
cally,  it is not possible  to find a price index that focuses  uniquely  on 
international competitiveness,  and yet it is often inappropriate to refer 
instead to export growth rates. More likely  than not, both imports and 
exports are rising at double-digit  rates and net exports are deteriorating. 
Second,  at a more fundamental level,  large productivity  gains  may 
simply mean high unemployment.  If firms shift to increasingly  capital- 
intensive technology  and their investment predominantly takes the form 
of  capital deepening  and shifting  to higher quality using  imported in- 
termediate goods,  the labor market problem remains. Quite a few firms 
succeed  and give  the impression  that it is possible  to live  with almost 
any exchange  rate, but that is no answer to the problems of the labor 
market, the domestic  economy,  or the financial sector. 
Table 4 reports trend growth rates of Brazilian productivity over the 
period  1970-95.  Claudio Considera,  from whom these data are taken, 
cautions  that the measurement of productivity  may be flawed because 
of difficulties  in measuring value added.25 Even so,  it is evident that if 
firms adjust to a high real exchange  rate,  the issue  of  how  to sustain 
full  employment  remains.  Budget  deficits  and a shift  in the  income 
distribution toward labor are, at best,  temporary solutions.  In Brazil's 
case,  the  large real appreciation  reflects  the redistribution of  income 
and is  accommodated  by the rise  in spending  that has followed  from 
strong wage  increases  and budget expansion.  Unemployment  has not 
yet  risen precipitously,  but the tension  is  already present both in the 
labor market and in the external balance. 
The Budget Issue 
The budget deficit is among the more important unresolved  issues  in 
the aftermath of  Brazil's  stabilization.  Table  5 reports annual budget 
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Table 5.  Budget  Balances  and Public  Debt,  1991-96 
Percent of GDP 
AntnuZal  balanicee 
Primiiary  bMcdgetb  Operationial bludget 
Year  Total  Federal  Total  Federcil  Accinnulated debt 
1991  3.0  0.8  1.5  0.3  43.5 
1992  2.3  1.3  -  2.2  -  0.8  42.8 
1993  2.6  1.4  0.3  0.0  36.4 
1994  4.3  3.0  0.5  1.6  28.5 
1995  0.3  0.6  -4.8  -  1.6  31.7 
1996  -0.7  0.4  -3.9  -  1.7  35.1 
Source: Data are provided directly by the Cenitial Bank of Brazil. the Brazilian Miinistiy of Finance, and Gaiantia. 
a. Positive numilbers  inidicate  surplus. 
b. Excludes interest payments. 
c.  Inicludes  inflation-adjUsted  initerest. 
balances and public debt for Brazil over the period 1991-96.  The melt- 
ing down of debt under the Collor freeze  helped to improve the budget 
by cutting  debt service.  However,  the very high real interest rates of 
1995 have restored much of that debt.  The operational budget deficit, 
which  reflects  substantial  state deficits  rather than federal  deficits,  is 
not so large as to create a financing problem for Brazil.  But in conjuc- 
tion with the still high levels  of debt, it will certainly make a new spell 
of high interest rates troublesome.  It is also clear that the deficit is too 
large and sticky for major reforms to wipe out soon.  Thus,  if there is a 
problem,  the budget deficit and the debt will  make it worse-possibly 
much worse.  Without a problem,  in a growing economy  the deficit will 
not push up the debt ratio dramatically. From that point of view,  gradual 
deficit reduction is a plausible  strategy. 
Brazil's  public finances are attracting the most attention in financial 
markets. Efforts to promote higher national saving and financial stabil- 
ity must focus on the budget. Nevertheless,  the real exchange rate issue 
seems more serious.  Even countries without fiscal problems experience 
currency crises-for  example,  Mexico. 
To What Extent Has Brazil Reformed? 
Brazil has a history of pervasive  statism,  from public  sector enter- 
prises  to  trade protection,  from  administered  labor  markets to  price 388  Brookinigs Papers  oni Economic  Activity,  1:1997 
management  in  oligopolistic  sectors.  The  surprise  is  just  how  well 
Brazil did when it was doing well.  In emerging  economies  around the 
world,  the  race  is  on  to  reform,  downsize  the  state,  and  strive  for 
openness  as a means of  improving  productivity  and gaining  access  to 
external resources.  How well  is Brazil doing,  compared to other coun- 
tries? The answer is unambiguous: not very well.  A number of surveys 
report on reform.  Whether their approach is broad or highly  specific, 
they all conclude that Brazil is among the slow or incomplete reformers. 
One  survey  that ambitiously  covers  the world  is conducted  by the 
Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal.26 The topics covered 
include trade, taxation, government intervention, monetary policy,  for- 
eign direct investment,  the banking sector,  wages  and prices,  property 
rights,  regulation,  and black markets. The scores  range from  1 (free) 
to  5  (repressed).  Brazil  is placed  ninety-fourth  out of  150 countries, 
with a score of 3.35,  which falls in the category of "mostly  not free." 
In this  survey,  Brazil  performs as well,  or poorly,  as Mexico,  better 
than Venezuela  (3.60),  but worse  than Pakistan  (3.10).  It ranks far 
worse than Chile (2.25)  and South Korea (2.45),  and even than Argen- 
tina  (2.65)-which,  like  Brazil,  is  penalized  by  the  survey's  use  of 
long-term rather than recent inflation data.27 
Another  survey  of  reform  performance  is  provided  by  the  Inter- 
American Development  Bank.28 It covers  a comprehensive  set of indi- 
cators of  structural reform,  including  the external  sector,  tax policy, 
financial policy,  privatization,  labor market regulation,  and the pension 
system.  Countries  are assessed,  according  to  a four-fold  system,  as 
early or late reformers and slow  or fast reformers. Brazil emerges  as a 
late and slow  reformer, as do Venezuela  and Mexico.29  Argentina and 
Chile,  by contrast,  are early and fast reformers. 
The World Economic  Forum (under the direction of Jeffrey Sachs), 
evaluates  a group business  survey on a number of  indicators-giving 
special  weight  to openness,  financial and labor markets, budgets,  and 
regulation-to  form  a "competitiveness"  index  for forty-nine  coun- 
26.  Holmes,  Johnson,  and Kirkpatrick (1997). 
27.  The emphasis  on a history of low  inflation,  as opposed  to a recent episode  that 
remains on probation, is appropriate because so many stabilization  programs have failed. 
28.  Inter-American Developent  Bank (1996)  and Lora (1997). 
29.  See  Lora (1997,  p.  19). Rudiger Dornbusch  389 
tries.30 In this  horse  race,  Brazil  ranks as  number 48,  one  position 
behind Venezuela  and far behind Mexico  (33)  and Chile  (18),  and is 
trailed only by Russia. 
Economic  Freedom  of the World, 1975-95  is an annual assessment 
of economic  freedom issued by a group of market-oriented institutes.3' 
For a group of  103 countries,  an index summarizes four sets of criteria: 
money and inflation, government operation and regulation,  takings and 
discriminatory taxation,  and restraints on international exchange.  Over 
the period  1993-95,  Brazil ranks as number 97.  The report concludes 
that "Brazil's  policies  conflict with economic  freedom in almost every 
area.  ' 
32 
The  American  Express  Bank provides  a score  card for a group of 
forty-three developing  countries .  Using the criteria of macroeconomic 
stability,  human capital,  market orientation,  export  orientation,  and 
investment,  countries  are sorted  into  five  groups,  according  to  their 
degree  of  "tiger-ness"  (in allusion  to the Asian  "tiger"  economies). 
Those  in the top group are "confirmed  tigers"  and those in the bottom 
group are "stragglers."  Brazil,  which  scores  30 out of  100 points,  is 
placed  in the next-to-last  group,  as an "emerging  tiger."  Within this 
group  it ranks last,  tied  with  Zimbabwe.  Of  the entire  sample,  only 
Pakistan and Nigeria  have  lower  scores  than Brazil  and are classified 
as stragglers. 
Brazil  has brought down  inflation  and its performance  is  certainly 
not  among  the  worst  of  reformers  worldwide.  But  this  summary of 
surveys  shows  that Brazil is,  at best,  in the middle of the field and, by 
all accounts,  is a reluctant and tardy reformer. 
The Policy Problem 
The problem facing  Brazil's  policymakers  can be summarized in a 
simple diagram that focuses  on the social objective  of high real wages, 
30.  For a discussion  of  the index,  see  Jeffrey  D.  Sachs,  "Why  Good  Policy  Mat- 
ters,"  World Link, July-August,  pp. 8-9. 
31.  Gwartney,  Lawson,  and Block  (1996). 
32.  Gwartney,  Lawson,  and Block  (1996,  p.  125). 
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Figure 6.  The Latin Triangle 
Wage in dollars 
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Source:  Author's  model, as described  in text. 
the target of  full  employment,  and the constraint  of  limited  external 
deficits.  Figure  6  shows  three schedules.  Along  and above  WW, the 
wage  in dollars,  and hence  the real wage,  is  at least  at its minimum 
acceptable  level.  But the real wage  affects  competitiveness,  as do the 
levels  of  demand and output.  Along  FF,  the external balance  reaches 
its  target  level.  Points  above  and to  the  right  of  FF  correspond  to 
unacceptable  deficits.  Finally,  points to the left of YY  represent unem- 
ployment  (informality),  while  points to the right of  YY correspond to 
overheating. 
The diagram is deliberately  drawn to highlight  a policy  conflict.  At 
B there is full  employment  and external balance,  but the real wage  is 
unacceptably low; this might be called the International Monetary Fund 
equilibrium.  At A the real wage  is politically  acceptable  and there is 
full employment,  but the deficit is too large.  I call this the Latin equi- 
librium; it is the typical overborrowing equilibrium.  Finally,  at C there 
is unemployment  with the target real wage.  This represents the familiar 
retrenchment in response  to external deficits,  but in a situation where 
devaluation is not acceptable.  It is typical of the year before an election, 
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The obvious solution is to break out of the overdeterminacy by means 
of a boost to productivity: workers can have their jobs,  their real wages, 
and their competitiveness,  all at the same time. But if productivity does 
not grow,  or if improvements  are predominantly labor saving,  protec- 
tion would be an alternative course of action.  As would borrowing,  in 
the hope that the situation would sort out in time.  Neither alternative is 
good economic  policy. 
How Vulnerable Is Brazil? 
As noted above,  it is very unlikely  that Brazil will  suffer the fate of 
Mexico.  There are good  reasons  why  Brazil is a very different  story. 
In particular, there is no single point of acute vulnerability,  and policy- 
makers operate with maximum flexibility.  Jogo de cintura and jeitinho 
are essential  concepts  of Brazilian policymaking,  consistency  is not.34 
Other points in Brazil's  favor are as follows: 
-Brazil  has not promised anything,  is performing beyond expecta- 
tions,  and keeps  alive hopes for doing more in the future. No firm line 
has been drawn and no date has been set as decisive.  Hence there is no 
cause for disillusionment,  and that is a great source of stability. 
-Brazil  has  no explicit  inflation  target or nominal  exchange  rate 
commitment.  As  a result,  the government  has been able to move  to a 
crawling  peg  exchange  rate to  avoid  further real  appreciation.  That 
leaves  the question of whether there is overvaluation,  but it eliminates 
the prospect of a nominal anchor that will gradually and inevitably  sink 
the ship. 
-Brazil  has $60  billion  in foreign  exchange  reserves.  When prob- 
lems come  and speculators attack, reserves are never enough-neither 
in Britain nor in Mexico-but  high  reserves  deter attacks in the first 
place.  Moreover,  it is  unlikely  that the  Brazilian  government  would 
just stand by and watch, or even accommodate a fall in reserves,  as did 
its Mexican  counterpart. 
-There  is political continuity.  President Cardoso, who is considered 
a reformer, is expected  to seek and win reelection  in 1998,  on the basis 
of the record of low inflation.  Optimists will  interpret the reelection  as 
34.  These  terms  defy  translation;  loosely,  they  refer to  getting  around rules  and 
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a mandate to "continue"  reforms.  And it will encourage the market to 
believe  that there will  not be any exchange  rate experiments. 
-Notwithstanding  the recovery  from the 1995 slowdown,  inflation 
is not picking up. As a result, there is no need for a renewed slowdown 
and the attendant political  risk to the popularity of President Cardoso. 
-Brazil  does  not have  an external  financing  problem and there is 
none  in sight,  as yet.  The current account  deficit,  although rising,  is 
less  than $30  billion,  far below  that of Mexico  as a share of GDP.  So 
far, external financing has been possible  with declining  interest rates. 
A substantial portion of  the deficit  is being  financed by direct invest- 
ment,  so that liquidity  issues  are commensurably  less  salient. 
-If  the external balance were to become  a problem, controls could 
mitigate  it.  In fact,  some  of  the liberalization  measures  of  the early 
1990s have already been reversed. 
-Significant  public  sector  assets  have  yet  to be privatized.  Their 
privatization  will  not only  provide budget revenues,  but can also be a 
source of external financing.  More broadly,  it will  foster Brazil's  rep- 
utation as being  in a reformist mode. 
From this list,  one must conclude  that Brazil will be able to hold on 
to  stabilization  and go  forward,  with  moderate  reform  and much  fi- 
nancing  .  .  .? But it cannot hold on forever.  Since the basic policy  mix 
is bad and reform is slow,  growth performance and financial stabiliza- 
tion will wear thin. Ultimately,  that would create sufficient vulnerability 
that even  Brazil  might  face,  if  not  a speculative  attack,  at least  an 
attrition of capital inflows.  The fact that this point may be far off must 
not encourage the view  that Brazil can wait to complete  its program of 
stabilization  and reform. 
In discussing  the possible  overvaluation  of the real,  Franco recog- 
nizes that large current account deficits-for  example,  the 6 to 7 percent 
of GDP in Mexico  in 1994-are  perilous.35 He further emphasizes  that 
it does not make sense for emerging economies  to aim to eliminate their 
deficits.  His golden  mean is 3 percent,  large enough to take advantage 
of world capital markets and small enough to avoid risk. Brazil is very 
likely to leave that safe place during 1997, unless the government either 
imposes  more trade restrictions  or slows  down demand.  Forecasts  for 
the  current account  deficit  in  1998,  the election  year,  now  run to  5 
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percent of GDP.  There is a conflict  between  external stability and do- 
mestic  growth; with a strongly appreciated real exchange  rate, options 
narrow and risks  increase.  If reform  is  to  pave  the way  for Brazil's 
future, reform must come  soon and forcefully.36 
Conclusion 
To date, Brazil's  stabilization has been limited to lowering inflation, 
while  real wages  have been raised dramatically and the real exchange 
rate has been allowed  to appreciate significantly.  The public celebrates 
the end of  inflation,  but in fact  it is celebrating  the large rise  in real 
incomes,  which  it associates  with the end of inflation rather than with 
real wages  and a real exchange  rate that are potentially  unsustainable. 
There is pervasive evidence  that good economic  policy  leads to high 
growth. Good economic  policy  not only comprises  a set of institutions, 
raging  from  a lean  government  to  functioning  open  markets,  it  also 
includes  high  rates of  saving  and investment.  In Brazil,  the  rate of 
saving  is low  and so is the rate of investment.  Figure 7 shows  that the 
share of  investment  in GDP (in constant prices)  is currently barely  16 
percent and has been low for a decade.  If the consumption boom should 
give  way to saving  and investment,  and to reform in the fast lane,  the 
Real  Plan  will  have  been  a brilliant  platform  for  a dramatic shift  in 
Brazilian performance. 
But if,  as is more likely,  muddling along continues  to be the rule- 
with the real appreciation limiting the profitability of industry, external 
finance taking center stage,  the macroeconomy  being played to assure 
President  Cardoso's  reelection  in  1998,  and so  forth-Brazil  cannot 
expect  to move  to the 7 to 9 percent growth rate that routinely charac- 
terize successful  emerging  economies.  The country is still celebrating 
the success  at reducing  inflation; but it is time to start thinking  about 
how to realize  sustained high growth. 
Capital markets do not reliably provide a stable bridge for wages  to 
rise ahead of investment and jobs.  It might appear possible,  in the short 
run, to spend the income  ahead of investment  and output expansion  by 
36.  Paulo Rabelo de Castro rightly emphasizes  the need for the widening  and deep- 
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Figure  7. Investment  as a Share of GDP, 1960-95a 
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Source: Author's calculations based ott Brazilian natiottal accounts data provided directly by  the  Lnstituito  de  Pesquisa 
Econumica  Aplicada  (IPEAI. 
a. Calculated  using cottstatit  pr-ices. 
borrowing to finance deficits,  but this almost always results in a crisis. 
Even with international capital mobility,  the way to get ahead is to put 
the horse in front of the cart. Successful  reformers have gone  slow  on 
consumption  spending; they have emphasized competitiveness,  saving, 
and investment  as means of implementing  the opportunities opened up 
by  economic  reform.  A  real  appreciation  strategy,  while  seemingly 
helpful in terms of inflation,  invariably derails the growth process.  The 
real exchange  rate is a key component  of success,  as the case of Chile 
bears out.37 If Brazil does not shift to reform and saving,  the Real Plan 
will prove to be nothing but another botched populist stabilization plan. 
37.  See  Dornbusch and Edwards (1994)  and Williamson  (1996). Comments  and 
Discussion 
William  R.  Cline:  I like Dornbusch's  paper. I agree with  most of  it. 
My comments  seek  to push the implications  somewhat  further and to 
take a few  exceptions. 
This is an important paper. It clarifies Dornbusch's  views  on Brazil. 
Last summer the financial press had Dornbusch sounding the alarm. He 
had been among the few-certainly,  he was the most conspicuous  to 
predict the Mexican peso crisis,  so his new warnings on Brazil seemed 
significant.  Now,  however,  one  can  breathe a sigh  of  relief  that the 
Dornbusch rating system has upgraded Brazil from "crash"  to "muddle 
through. " 
Dornbusch's  central conclusions  are, first, that Brazil cannot reach 
its growth potential without further reform. I agree with that. Second, 
however,  he seems to place exchange  rate depreciation at the top of the 
list  of  reforms  needed  and fiscal  adjustment somewhat  below  that.  I 
would  certainly  reverse  that order of  priority.  Moreover,  it would  be 
helpful  if  the paper pursued the  substance  of  how  to reduce the real 
exchange  rate without destabilizing  the success  on inflation. 
The key issues of the paper are these: First, it suggests that there was 
a golden  era of  high growth in the  1960s  and 1970s.  I think that it is 
important to note,  however,  that there were severe  imbalances  in that 
growth, especially  in the 1970s.  In fact, I published a book with Brook- 
ings in February 1981 that refers to Brazil's  strategy for responding to 
the  1970s  oil  shock  as  "aggressive,"  with  expansionary  policy,  in- 
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creased protection,  and higher borrowing.  This left  "burdensome  ex- 
ternal debt that will  inhibit future efforts  at high growth."' 
Second,  the  paper states  that the Real  Plan  is  the first potentially 
successful  stabilization  plan.  I think  that Dornbusch's  evaluation  is 
broadly valid,  pending  further reform.  And the plan certainly  has an 
elegant  design.  Its  main  problem,  in  my  view,  has  been  the  inade- 
quate fiscal adjustment. This,  in turn, has necessitated excessively  tight 
money.  A consequence  is excessively  high real interest rates,  which, 
in the context  of  an abundant international capital market, mean large 
capital inflows  in response to interest arbitrage. Large capital inflows, 
in  their  turn,  drive  the  widening  of  the current account  deficit.  The 
challenge  is to reduce these imbalances,  and there has been some prog- 
ress.  For example,  the real interest rate has fallen  substantially  in the 
past year,  and there has been some  success  in curbing excess  demand. 
The third issue  that the paper raises  is real exchange  rate apprecia- 
tion.  The  real  exchange  rate has  indeed  increased.  The  Institute  of 
International Finance estimates  that the exchange  rate deflated by rel- 
ative wholesale  prices has increased by 15 to 20 percent under the Real 
Plan.  It seems  to me that this is probably more germane than the up to 
60 percent real appreciation suggested by some other measures.  Is even 
15 to 20 percent real appreciation too much? It is important to keep in 
mind  that before  the Real  Plan,  the current account  was  in balance. 
There was a zero external deficit,  which  is excessively  low  for a large 
developing  country. 
There is the question of the appropriate current account target. Dorn- 
busch  cites  Gustavo  Franco  as  preferring  a figure  of  3 percent  of 
GDP. That kind of magnitude has considerable merit. Suppose that one 
wanted the external  debt to stabilize  at 40  percent of  GDP.  It would 
take a current account  deficit  of  about 3 percent of  GDP,  on the one 
hand,  and real growth of  about 5 percent plus  a rise  in world  dollar 
prices  of  about  3  percent,  on  the  other,  to  be  compatible  with  that 
target. From this example,  3 percent might be appropriate; the current 
account deficit of about $24  billion  last year is at about that level. 
Brazil's  export base,  however,  is relatively  weak,  because  this is a 
large and inherently relatively  closed  economy.  Recent work confirms 
economists'  previous expectations  that exports are particularly relevant 
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in analyzing the sustainability  of the current account deficit.2 Mexico's 
current account deficit,  as a fraction of exports of goods  and services, 
was  50 percent before the peso  crisis.  By the same measure,  Brazil's 
current account deficit this past year was 40 percent. So,  there may not 
be as much comfort from the low fraction of GDP as one would like to 
think.  These  numbers suggest  that a current account deficit of around 
$30  billion  is  starting to get  into a zone  in which  one  has to be very 
careful. 
In sum,  I tend to agree that the real exchange  rate appreciation is a 
potential  source  of vulnerability.  The questions  are, on the one hand: 
how  much  vulnerability  does  it pose?  And  on  the other: what to  do 
about it? 
I would  note,  by the way,  that the  "Tequila  effect"  of early  1995 
was beneficial  to Brazil because  without that shock in the capital mar- 
kets,  policymakers  would  not have undertaken demand-curbing  mea- 
sures,  and so the external imbalance  would have become  even  wider. 
Fourth, the paper says  that there will  be no collapse  in Brazil  like 
the Mexican  peso  crash. Again,  I agree.  One reason is that Brazil has 
no  comparable  commitment  to  a quasi-fixed  exchange  rate.  Another 
reason  is that its  $60  billion  of  reserves  have considerable  protection 
from a fast runoff because they have minimum term limits.  Their most 
volatile  component  is  the  so-called  CC-5  accounts,  which  are,  basi- 
cally,  bank  deposits  and have  already  been  drawn  down.  Brazil's 
so-called  trade credit is probably exaggerated by speculative  flows,  but 
when  and if they  start to run off,  the authorities  are quite capable  of 
very carefully scrutinizing whether these credits were, in fact, for trade. 
Dornbusch  is right.  Brazilian  pragmatism means that interventions 
will be taken if necessary,  and that the government is unlikely  to stand 
by and witness  an utter collapse  in the name of  adherence  to  a rigid 
ideological  position  on an exchange  rate peg.  The most eloquent  evi- 
dence  for  this  so  far is  the  increase  in protection  for  automobiles  in 
1995. 
The fifth issue  raised by the paper is wages.  It is very encouraging 
that the wage data show a sharp increase in low-end  wages that reduces 
the poverty index.  Is this sustainable? I would  point out that much of 
this increase must be due to the elimination  of the inflation tax,  rather 
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than official wage policy.  There are also some statistical questions.  The 
Sao Paulo wage survey is perhaps affected by the fact that restructuring 
has shaken out the lower  wage  workers from the sample,  which  may 
tend to exaggerate  wage  increases. 
I guess  I do disagree with Dornbusch's  proposition that theory says 
that when a country reduces tariffs,  it must also lower wages.  It seems 
to me that this advice  may be prudent as a transitory measure,  but it 
does  not  follow  as  a steady  state.  If  one  believes  that lower  tariffs 
increase real output and if one  asserts that lower tariffs require lower 
wages,  one must be arguing that trade liberalization requires a redistri- 
bution of income away from labor to capital. I see no reason to propose 
this.  Indeed,  the Stolper-Samuelson  theory would  say that for Brazil, 
with  its  factor  endowments,  trade liberalization  should  have just  the 
opposite effect.  In terms of policy,  one would be hesitant to recommend 
trade liberalization  if,  somehow,  it would  inevitably  result in a major 
concentration of income. 
I think that the problem is that this is a partial-equilibrium approach. 
A general-equilibrium  approach would take cognizance  of the fact that 
protection biases production toward the domestic  market. Once protec- 
tion is reduced,  producers have an incentive  to reallocate  their output 
toward the export market. In this context,  while  Dornbusch points  to 
the sharp increase in import penetration, I would also note a substantial 
increase in exports of almost 25 percent from  1993 to  1996. 
Yes,  perhaps  Brazil  did  go  too  far.  The  decision  to  increase  the 
minimum wage sharply was probably a populist excess.  The minimum 
wage  affects  all pensioners,  as well  as those  earning at that level  and 
below.  But there has been some  correction lately: in 1996 government 
employees  received  a zero wage  increase. 
Sixth,  there is the issue of fiscal imbalance.  The flavor of the paper, 
to my taste, somewhat downplays the need for fiscal adjustment. It does 
say  some  favorable  things  about Argentina.  But  in comparison  with 
Brazil, Argentina has had a similar problem of an initial rise of the real 
exchange rate; the principal difference  is that Argentina has had a more 
impressive  fiscal  adjustment.  So,  in some  sense,  it is difficult  to both 
be more in favor of the Argentinean case and, at the same time,  place 
more emphasis  on the real exchange  rate than on fiscal adjustment, as 
the paper seems  to do. 
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Brazil  had such  high  inflation  in the past,  people  have  grown  accus- 
tomed to using the operational deficit,  which excludes  the inflationary 
component  of  interest payments.  But with Brazil  now  approximating 
more normal levels  of inflation,  by international standards, one needs 
to look  also  at the nominal deficit.  The nominal deficit  was 7 percent 
of GDP in  1995 and 6 percent last year. The paper says that the oper- 
ational deficit  is  "not  so  large."  I think that in his  oral presentation 
Dornbusch  laid  greater emphasis  on  the  need  for  fiscal  adjustment, 
which  makes more sense to me. 
Just one technical comment.  In the oral presentation, Dornbusch said 
that there is no sign of budget correction for 1997. I think that, formally, 
the budget calls  for a cut in the operational  deficit  from 4 percent to 
2.5  percent of GDP. 
The last issue  is saving  and investment.  It is right to emphasize  the 
need  for  higher  saving  and investment;  one  simply  cannot expect  to 
achieve  8 percent growth with saving  at less  than 20 percent of GDP. 
I would  note the link to the country's  fiscal posture.  The fiscal deficit 
is an important source of dissaving,  and it is no accident that the high- 
growth  Asian  countries  typically  have  zero  fiscal  balances  or  fiscal 
surpluses.  Moreover,  it is not quite accurate to say that growth has been 
solely  consumption  based.  Certainly,  in  1994 and 1995 the growth in 
investment  exceeded  that in consumption. 
In sum,  the paper seems  to say that it is essential  to depreciate the 
real exchange rate at this point because it has become overvalued.  There 
should  be  gradual fiscal  adjustments  and more reform,  although  the 
paper is rather vague on the substance of the additional reform. 
For my part, I would emphasize,  first, aggressive  fiscal adjustment; 
for example,  through constitutional  reform that eliminates,  or makes 
more flexible,  civil  service  tenure and overcomes  the serious problem 
of excessive  revenue-sharing  with the states. 
Second,  I would  pursue gradual real depreciation,  rather than any- 
thing more ambitious.  This  raises  the operational  question  of  how  to 
adjust the exchange  rate without destabilizing  the success  in reducing 
inflation.  The  paper is  silent  on this  issue.  One can  imagine  a sharp 
devaluation; and it seems  likely  that a devaluation of  15 or 20 percent 
or more would,  in fact, go a long way toward destabilizing  the progress 
against inflation. 
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is  0.5  percentage  point  per month,  more  or  less,  to  something  like 
0.8  or 0.9  percent per month,  sustained over two or three years could 
have a fairly good  chance  of  success.  The authorities could  even  cite 
the recent rise of  the dollar against the yen  and the deutsche  mark as 
the  motivating  force  for  such  a  change;  they  could  say  appropriate 
words  about  exchange  rate  baskets,  and  so  forth.  It might  also  be 
necessary to increase interest rates somewhat to assure that there is not 
a sudden pressure on reserves  in the face of an accelerated crawl. 
In the Brazilian  context,  it seems  quite possible  that this kind of  a 
shift  could  be  accomplished  without  provoking  an equal,  off-setting 
increase in domestic prices.  Brazilian expectations,  it seems to me,  are 
less sensitive  to the exchange  rate than most; Brazilians have tradition- 
ally looked  inward at the domestic  economy,  rather than to the dollar. 
They are the exact opposite  of the Argentineans  in this regard. Argen- 
tina's experience  of hyperinflation without indexation  made its public 
acutely  aware of the exchange  rate, so that a sharp devaluation  of the 
Argentinean peso  would likely  have severe  inflationary consequences. 
Finally,  what  does  the  international  capital  market imply  for  the 
feasibility  of  muddling  through? Currently,  this  market is  extremely 
abundant. It seems  quite  easy  to  finance  a current account  deficit  of 
$25 billion  to $30 billion,  especially  given  the large direct investment 
associated with privatization.  If U.S.  interest rates increase by no more 
than, say,  50 basis points,  there is no obvious  reason to expect  a sharp 
change in that outlook. 
Overall,  however,  it seems to me that there is little doubt that Brazil 
should move on fiscal reform. At the very least, it needs to avoid further 
real appreciation of the exchange  rate. It also needs to increase saving, 
and to limit external borrowing as the source of growth. 
General  discussion:  Benjamin Friedman asked Dornbusch how Brazil 
had achieved  such a large rise in real wages,  particularly at the bottom 
of  the income  distribution,  given  that GDP  growth  in the  1990s  had 
been so modest.  He noted that real wages  have risen for each decile  of 
the income distribution, so that it was not a case of redistribution among 
wage  earners.  Dornbusch  explained  that Brazil  has the most  unequal 
distribution  of  income  in  the  world,  after  Honduras,  and  so  it  was 
possible  to  make  the poor richer without  making  the rich poor.  The 
biggest gains have been for the lowest  income earners, but their wages Rudiger Dornbusch  401 
were  so  low  that a doubling  could  easily  be covered  by most  firms. 
More broadly, there has probably been some erosion of the profit share. 
Current data are not accurate,  but in the  1980s the wage  share was as 
low  as  32  percent,  so  there  was  ample  room  for  it to  expand  while 
maintaining  adequate returns to capital generally.  Only the firms with 
heavy exposure to international trade would be badly hurt, and indeed, 
firms in sectors  such as textiles  and automobiles  are going  bankrupt. 
William  Brainard pointed out that this hypothesis  would not explain 
how  the  stock  market could  increase  by  30  percent.  But  Dornbusch 
noted  that Brazil's  stock  market is  only  now  catching  up to the bull 
market in emerging  market stocks.  William  Branson observed  that if 
wages  were only  30 percent of income,  a 12 percent rise in real GDP 
and 40  percent  growth  in real wages  would  not reduce the nonwage 
part of GDP at all,  presumably leaving  ample room for overall  profits 
to rise.  Branson added that the large current account deficit of around 
50 percent of exports could  raise worries  about currency depreciation 
having  substantial J-curve  effects,  and thus pose  credibility  problems 
for a policy  of depreciation. 402  Brookiu7gs Papers  oni Economic  Activity,  1.1997 
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